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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the voluntary use of 
password management applications in order to address 
a decades-old and ubiquitous information security 
problem related to poor password management.  In our 
exploratory analysis, we investigate two related issues: 
(1) why home end-users chose not to use password 
management applications and (2) why high behavioral 
intentions to use password management applications 
did not always lead to actual usage for certain users.  
We found that issues related to the technology such as 
lack of trust or memory limitations, individual issues 
such as perceived costs and benefits, and a lack of 
concern about the threat (threat apathy) were the 
primary inhibitors of lack of use.  For those that had 
high intentions to use a password management 
application but failed to actually use the software, we 
found that a variety of individual issues such as lack of 
immediacy and having insufficient time were the 
primary inhibitors leading to this breakdown. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Organizations often rely upon tailored information 
security policies (ISPs) and security education training 
and awareness (SETA) programs to inform employees 
of the security threats they face and the appropriate, and 
often mandatory, actions to mitigate those threats [10, 
12].  Improving the content and impact of corporate 
SETA programs is often a goal of organizational 
security behavior research [29, 18].  Home end-users, in 
comparison, do not have the benefit of an established 
ISP or professional SETA program in their personal 
lives [2].  As a result, home end-users may have little 
understanding of the security threats they face or the 
tools and actions they can take to protect their 
information assets [2]. 
 
Even if home end-users do understand the risks and 
appropriate mitigating actions, prescriptive security 
behaviors are completely voluntary.  For example, 
although users may understand the need to keep their 
PC’s operating system current with the latest security 
updates, compliance is completely voluntary with few 
repercussions until a security incident, such as a 
ransomware or malware infection, occurs.  Research 
into improving home end-user security behaviors is thus 
challenged by a potential lack of threat awareness, lack 
of awareness of mitigating security behaviors, and 
perhaps even a lack of desire to voluntarily take 
recommended actions [2]. 
 
One home end-user information security behavior 
related to a variety of different threats is password 
management.  Within organizations, employers 
typically mandate the use of strong passwords and the 
regular changing of those passwords.  However, home 
end-users do not have this mandate and often do not 
change their relatively weak passwords [21].  Due to the 
difficulty in maintaining and remembering multiple 
passwords, many home end-users also have a single 
password for multiple sites, which is very problematic 
especially if the password is relatively weak [13, 38]. 
 
Password management applications exist to help 
resolve these types of problems, especially for the home 
end-user who does not benefit from built-in network 
applications that require certain types of password 
practices.  Computer security professionals, the United 
States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-
CERT), and the internationally recognized SANS 
Institute all strongly recommend the use of password 
manager applications [45, 25, 26].  Yet, adoption rates 
in the workplace and for home end-users are very low 
[24].  The purpose of our paper is to investigate why this 
is the case.  We specifically address the following two 
interconnected research questions: (1) why do home 
end-users fail to adopt password management 
applications and (2) why do certain home end-users 
have high behavioral intentions to use password 
management applications but then fail to follow through 
on those intentions?  
 
In order to address these research questions, we 
conducted an empirical investigation of 283 college 
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students who were presented information about the risks 
of poor password management and given the 
recommendation to adopt the use of a dedicated 
password manager application.  The participants 
decided to either voluntarily adopt (or not) the use of a 
free commercial password management application.  
We then asked our research subjects open ended 
questions concerning their adoption intentions and the 
reasons why they actually adopted and used the 
password management application.  We found 
individual issues related to laziness, lack of time, and 
lack of immediacy were the primary behavioral 
inhibitors, while the strongest behavioral enabler was a 
belief in the response efficacy of the recommended 
password management application.  We also found a 
variety of individual issues led to the breakdown 
between having high behavioral intentions to use the 
software and a failure to actually use the software. 
 
2. Background & Related Literature  
 
Much of the research on information security 
practices focuses on behavioral intentions and not on 
actual behaviors [41, 14].  This is primarily due to 
decades of research that has empirically demonstrated 
that there is generally a fairly strong correlation between 
behavioral intentions and actual behaviors across a 
variety of actions [1, 3, 22].  However, more recent 
studies have started to evaluate both security intent and 
actual behaviors [15, 44, 7], but none have specifically 
explored factors that inhibit or support the transition 
from intent to actual behavior. 
 
Numerous theories have been used to explain 
behavioral intentions in the context of information 
security actions.  The most common theoretical 
perspectives are the theory of planned behavior, 
protection motivation theory, and general deterrence 
theory [4].  Most of the published research, irrespective 
of the theories being used, focuses on the first or second 
order antecedents of behavioral intentions with the 
assumption that there is a strong link between intentions 
and actual behaviors.  This has largely been left as an 
untested assumption.  Therefore, more research is 
needed to determine the enablers and inhibitors 
associated with the link between security related 
behavioral intentions and actual behaviors [41, 14]. 
 
In addition to suggesting that future information 
security research focus on both behavioral intentions 
and actual behaviors, Siponen and Vance [36] call for 
information security research that has more practical 
value in the user context.  One such practically relevant 
security issue, but still theoretically rich, is password 
management.  The password is still the primary means 
of protecting personal information online [25] and 
managing (which includes remembering) all of one’s 
different passwords is still a major problem [42], 
especially for home end-users who tend to be very 
casual concerning their passwords [21]. 
 
The primary problems associated with end-user 
passwords is that they are often weak (easy to guess) and 
many users re-use the same password on multiple online 
accounts [25, 45].  Whereas weak passwords will 
always be easy for criminals to guess, even the use of 
very strong passwords on multiple accounts is 
dangerous because all it takes is one account to be 
compromised for several other accounts to be affected.  
Survey data indicate that up to 2/3 of online users use 
the same password for multiple or all online accounts 
[17, 30].   
 
The effect of poor password management practices 
is tangible.  According to the well-respected 2016 
Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR), 
legitimate user credentials (login ids and passwords) 
were used in over 50% of all reported data breaches in 
2015.  An analysis of 2260 confirmed data breaches in 
2015 determined 63% involved “leveraging a weak, 
default, or stolen password” [40] (p. 20).  Separate 
analysis of actual attacker tactics shows they 
specifically target end-user passwords in order to gain 
access to both personal and corporate information 
resources [6].   
 
The security actions recommended to combat weak 
and/or reused passwords are to create and use only 
strong passwords and use a unique password for each 
end-user account [35].  Strong passwords are typically 
defined as passwords that contain at least 12 
alphanumeric characters, both upper and lower case 
letters, at least one number, and at least one special 
character [35].  Unfortunately, the average end-user has 
dozens of personal and work-related passwords [17], 
and remembering many strong passwords is difficult.  
To assist users with proper password hygiene, the use of 
password manager applications is strongly 
recommended [45, 25].  Password management 
applications store all of a user’s passwords in one 
location that is cryptographically protected and 
accessible through one (ideally) strong master 
passphrase, alleviating the burden of memorizing many 
unique strong passwords [25].  Empirical analysis of 
actual password behaviors has shown that users can 
remember a small number of strong, complex 
passwords, especially when used often (such as when 
unlocking the password manager) [42]. 
 
There are many password managers available for 
purchase, including several highly-regarded free 
applications.  In this study, we introduced the 
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participants to several password managers but 
specifically recommended the use of LastPass, a free 
password manager that is widely used in both 
enterprises and by end-users (see https://lastpass.com/ 
for more detail). 
 
From the behavioral adoption perspective, there are 
two main issues associated with password management 
applications that require additional research.  First, 
behavioral intentions to use password management 
software have been shown to not be good indicators of 
actual usage of the software [42].  This makes password 
management applications an excellent context to 
investigate the link between intention to use the 
software and actual use of the software, which will 
strengthen the theoretical understanding of security 
adoption technologies (more broadly than just password 
management applications).  For instance, it is possible 
that certain antecedents of intentions may be better 
contextualized as both direct and indirect effects on 
actual behaviors. 
 
Second, adoption rates of password managers are 
very low [24, 26].  This category of software solves a 
very important problem, but home end-users have low 
adoption intentions and actual usage of these software 
packages [33, 26].  Therefore, it is important from both 
a theoretical and a practical standpoint to understand 
why this is the case.  Existing literature offers certain 
hypotheses such as the software may be difficult to use, 
the real or perceived costs of using these applications 
may outweigh the benefits, a lack of self-confidence on 
behalf of the home end-user, and so on [4].  More 
research is needed to further our understanding of the 
low adoption rates of a category of applications that is, 
generally speaking, highly useful and purportedly easy 
to use. 
 
3. Research Design & Methods  
 
3.1 Research Subjects 
 
In order to investigate password management 
software adoption among home end-users, we used 
undergraduate college students from a US private 
university as our research subjects.  While there is often 
criticism about using college students in academic 
research, much of that criticism comes from trying to 
extend the results of student-derived data to other 
organizational contexts and populations [31].  When 
investigating home end-user information security 
practices, however, we consider college students an 
excellent population to study due to their extensive use 
of technology, familiarity with online applications (such 
as social networking sites and school-related 
information systems), and also the perception that 
college students are not overly conscientious with their 
information privacy and security [20, 23].  Additionally, 
many college students are expected to enter the greater 
work force in the next 1 to 4 years.  Therefore, 
understanding and improving the security behaviors of 
this demographic is important at both the individual and 
organizational levels. Furthermore, numerous studies 
that have explored security behaviors (including 
password management) [7, 38, 42, 16, 27] have used 
college students in their research studies.  
 
A total of 372 undergraduate students were provided 
the opportunity to participate in this study in return for 
a small amount of course extra credit.  A total of 286 
responses were collected during the first phase of the 
data collection (which included the fear appeal and 
measurement of behavioral intent), representing a 77% 
response rate.  After eliminating those who participated 
in the first part of the study but did not complete the 
second phase (which collected information about actual 
security behavior), we were left with 283 usable data 
points for the second phase. 
 
Of the 283 usable data points, 10 (3.5%) were 
already using a dedicated password manager application 
(LastPass 1Password, KeePass, or similar).  These 10 
participants were asked more detailed questions about 
their experiences with password management software 
and excluded from the second phase of our study.  From 
the remaining 273 participants, 37 (13.5%) decided to 
install and use a password manager after the first data 
collection phase, and 236 (86.5%) decided not to install 
and use the application. 
 
3.2 Data Collection 
 
The first phase of the data collection provided the 
participants with a link to an online video that included 
a fear appeal message related to poor password 
management and a survey to measure behavioral 
constructs and their intent to install and use a password 
manager within the following week.  The fear appeal 
inside of the threat message is crucial in defining the 
threat and providing mitigating actions [7, 27].  For this 
part of our study, we used the guidelines of Witte, et al. 
[43] and the summarized fear appeal findings from 
Ruiter, et al. [34] to build our fear appeal message.  
Witte, et al. [43] argue that successful fear appeals must 
include two components – (1) a threat component that 
articulates the magnitude of the threat whereby there is 
a real possibility that the danger associated with the 
threat can occur to the participant (on a personal level), 
and (2) a recommended response that communicates 
that the prescriptive solution works, is within the 
capability of the recipient of the message, and also 
addresses common barriers from performing the 
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designated response.  The specific threat message was 
formatted in a video (available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ru3JXo7YoVc).  
The contents and video format of the message were 
developed through a series of three pilot studies with 
students and academics. 
 
All questions for the survey instrument came from 
pre-existing and pre-validated scales.  From Boss, et al. 
[7], we used the definition of behavioral intent as the 
self-reported intention to perform the subject security 
action (in this case, install and use a password manager).  
Behavioral intent to use a password manager application 
was measured in both data collection phases 
(immediately after the security threat message and one 
week later when actual behavior was measured).  In 
order to differentiate between whether a participant 
merely downloaded the recommended software or 
actually used the application to perform password 
management functions, we asked several questions that 
could be answered only by using the “Security 
Challenge” tool built into the password manager.  These 
questions included the users providing the relative 
strength of their master password associated with their 
password manager, the aggregate security score for all 
their accounts as determined by the application, and the 
total number of accounts in their password manager 
application at the time of data collection.  These 
additional details were captured to provide proof of 
application installation and use that could only come 
from a password manager and also to gather data about 
initial use of the password manager application for areas 
of future examination.  
 
The second phase of the data collection was 
conducted one week after completion of the first survey 
to ascertain whether the participants followed through 
with the security behavior, which was the adoption of 
the password management application.  The timeframe 
of one week between data collection was determined by 
interviewing 15 students who were taking part in a class-
related password manager application pilot study.  
These students almost unanimously stated that if they 
did not take a voluntary action within a couple of days 
of being exposed to the action, they would probably 
never take the recommended action without being re-
prompted.  One week was chosen to conservatively 
allow enough time for a participant to voluntarily install 
a password manager application or not.  
 
In the second phase of the data collection, 
participants were asked whether they took the 
recommended, yet voluntary, security-relation action to 
download and start using a free password manager 
application (LastPass) or some other password manager.  
Actual behavior was adjudicated based upon questions 
that could only be answered through the use of a 
password manager (as described above).  Participants 
that chose not to use a password manager were asked an 
open-ended question about the reasons they used to 
justify the non-action as well as their intentions to use a 
password manager sometime in the future.   
 
3.3 Qualitative Analysis 
 
Empirical analyses of participant responses focused 
on identifying and exploring behavioral factors that 
interfered with or facilitated the transition of intending 
to install and use a password manager.  To accomplish 
this goal, we conducted an iterative coding process 
modeled after Vaast and Kaganer [39].   
 
The first step of the analyses consisted of inductive 
open coding [39] of the participant open-ended 
responses for both compliance with the recommended 
security behavior (use of a password manager) and non-
compliance.  We started by having two of the authors 
randomly select 50 participant responses from the 
dataset and code them independently.  There was no a 
priori coding schema; we allowed the codes to emerge 
from the data.  A coding unit was defined as a segment 
of text ranging from one sentence to one paragraph.  
However, a single segment of text could include several 
codes.   
 
We coded the 50 responses independently from each 
other.  After each of the coding rounds, we reviewed our 
respective codes and reconciled any discrepancies 
through discussion prior to consolidating the findings.  
Per [39], we used the coding schema from the first round 
to evaluate another 50 randomly-selected responses 
each, while simultaneously modifying and extending 
the coding schema to capture new and emerging themes 
and concepts [19].  
 
In order to ensure that all coders understood the 
definitions of each category, we brought in another 
coder that did not take part in the code creation process.  
One of the original coders and the new coder examined 
50 responses together using the final coding schema and 
then independently coded a sample of the same 100 
responses to assess inter-rater reliability.  The two 
coders agreed 89% of the time, which is a simple 
Cohen’s Kappa value of 0.85, suggesting an acceptable 
level of inter-coder reliability [28].  Coding 
disagreements were discussed and resolved together. 
Eventually, we evaluated all of the responses iteratively 
and independently.  The resulting coding scheme and 
associated themes are defined and illustrated with 
examples in Table 1. 
 
  
4064
5 
 
4. Results 
 
Although the focus of this paper is on qualitative 
content analysis, we do incorporate basic descriptive 
statistics in order to further guide the interpretation of 
our data, which is consistent with the recommendation 
of Boyatzis [9].  The behavioral intentions scores of 
those that chose not to take the security action (mean = 
4.05, n = 236, s.d. = 1.43) showed effectively neutral 
intentions to install and use a password manager, which 
played out.  However, comparing the results of the first 
phase behavioral intentions scores with the second 
phase data collection scores for these participants (mean 
= 4.66, n = 236, s.d. = 1.48) showed a statistically 
significant increase in the same population’s intention to 
use a password manager in the future (t = -7.02, df = 
237, p < 0.001).  This indicates that study participants 
that were exposed to the poor password management 
threat message from this study were influenced to at 
least consider using a password manager in the future 
following the second phase of the data collection.  We 
did not measure whether this same group of participants 
eventually did install and use a password manager.   
 
Our qualitative data analysis identified eight 
individual behavioral inhibitors that influenced study 
participants against taking the recommended security 
action of installing and using a dedicated password 
manager application.  We grouped these factors into 
three main themes: (1) Individual Inhibitors, (2) Threat 
Apathy, and (3) Technology Inhibitors.   
 
4.1 Individual Inhibitors  
 
We define individual inhibitors as any real or 
perceived conflict with or drain on limited individual 
resources to include tangible assets (such as time and 
money) or cognitive capacity (such as memory, 
perceived self-efficacy, expected effort required).  
Individual inhibitors were reported by 72% of the study 
participants.  Our analysis identified four factors 
(presented in order of highest occurrence) that interfered 
with our participants’ personal capacity to take the 
recommended security action. 
 
Insufficient Time 
 
The most common factor cited in our study (41% of 
the participants) for deciding not to take the 
recommended security action was a perceived lack of 
time to install (or configure) and use the password 
manager.   In many cases, the respondents explicitly 
stated an intention to take the security action, but other 
tasks had higher priority.  For example: 
“I thought about installing a password manager 
application, but just didn't have the time to set aside 
to do so.” 
 
In some extreme cases, the respondents took a 
cavalier approach towards their lack of time 
management, identifying themselves as lazy even in the 
face of danger. 
“Most likely arrogance and being lazy. I have never 
had one of my passwords stolen so would most 
likely wait until that happened before installing a 
password manager.” 
 
Lack of Immediacy  
   
A sizable portion (15%) of the participants identified 
their intent to take the security action, but because they 
did not act promptly, they ended up forgetting to do so.  
This is an interesting issue, especially with all of the 
distractions from the plethora of different gadgets that 
users face on a daily basis.  For example,   
"I got distracted by something else and honestly 
forgot, but when I remember I want to try one!!"   
 
And, in numerous cases, having to identify the main 
reason for their inaction led to a restatement of their 
planned intent to take the security action in the future 
(which is supported by the quantitative analysis reported 
earlier). 
“I forgot about it--I will install one now that I've been 
reminded again.” 
 
Excessive Effort Required 
 
The third most cited (12.2% of respondents) 
individual behavioral inhibitor related to the perceived 
effort required to take the security action.  When the 
expected effort required to install and populate the 
password manager was perceived as more than the 
participant was willing to expend to counter the 
password management threat, they abandoned their 
intentions to take the action. 
“I didn't want to take the time to set up a new 
application and enter in all my passwords.” 
 
However, there were cases where the expected level 
of effort would be considered acceptable in the future 
when the participants’ professional circumstances 
changed. 
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Table 1: Themes, codes, definitions, and examples from participants that did not perform the recommended security action 
Theme 
Codes  
(Behavioral Inhibitors) Definitions   Examples 
          
Individual Inhibitors 
(Salience = 72%) 
Insufficient Time Participants reported that they did not have the 
slack time resources to allocated towards taking 
the security action  
  "Time. I put it on my todo list but I prioritized other 
things. To be fair, i'm usually slow about doing 
updates and such. I will do it eventually." 
  Lack of Immediacy Participant planned to install the application but 
did not so do promptly; in time they eventually 
forgot to follow through with their intention. 
  "I honestly forgot, but when I remember I want to 
try one!! " 
  Excessive Effort Expected effort to install and populate the 
password manager is more than the participant 
wants to expend 
  "I didn't want to take the time to look up my 
password every time I encountered a log in.  It 
would be time consuming for something that I do 
not feel I am at high risk for." 
  Low Self-efficacy Participants unsure if they are capable of 
installing and using password manager 
applications properly 
  "I feel as though I am not good enough with 
computers to know how to install a password 
manager so I'll just try to remember my passwords." 
          
Threat Apathy 
(Salience = 25%) 
Threat Apathy Participants do not think that the threats from 
poor password management are worthy of taking 
any additional action. 
  "I do not feel like I need one. I typically remember 
most of my passwords even if it takes me a try or 
two for a site I do not have to enter the password for 
very often." 
          
Technology Inhibitors 
(Salience = 20%) 
Alternative Solution Participants already have some kind of password 
management system in place, but not a dedicated 
application. 
  "I feel that I can more effectively manage my own 
passwords by manually recording them in a 
physical notebook." 
  Lack of Trust Participants do not trust password manager 
applications to keep their passwords safe 
  "Not super interested, and keeping all of my 
passwords in one place scares me. 
  Insufficient Awareness Participant requires additional information about 
password managers before deciding to take the 
security action 
  "I am still thinking about it, I want to understand 
how to use it and install it." 
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 “I didn't think it would be very useful at this point in 
my life. I'm about to graduate and get all new emails 
and accounts so maybe in the future when I'm all 
settled in my full time job it will be more beneficial 
and worth the effort to get a password manager 
application.” 
 
Low Self-efficacy 
 
The final individual inhibitor (5% of participants) 
related to the participants’ self-assessed ability to 
successfully complete the recommended security action.  
Self-efficacy, a central tenet of social cognitive theory 
and the theory of planned behavior, represents an 
individual’s belief that they are capable of performing a 
specific behavior where higher self-efficacy results in 
greater effort to persist in the face of obstacles [5].  A 
small group of participants identified low self-efficacy 
with computer technology as the primary reason they 
did not take the security action. 
"I feel as though I am not good enough with 
computers to know how to install a password 
manager so I'll just try to remember my passwords." 
 
Others felt that perhaps the installation and use of the 
password manager application itself was beyond their 
capabilities. 
“To add the password manager application onto my 
computer seems simple enough, but getting all the 
information in it and then using it seems a little bit too 
complex. I will try the password manager application 
after final exams when I am able to get some help 
from my techie friend.” 
 
4.2 Threat Apathy 
 
The second most common theme or category of 
behavior inhibitors was threat apathy.  Threat apathy 
occurs when individuals do not necessarily pay attention 
to security because they just do not consider the 
recommended information security action (and its 
related threat) to be important [8, 37].  Exactly one 
quarter (25%) of respondents felt that the threat of poor 
password management was not a big enough concern for 
them to change their current security behaviors. 
“Although the survey made me more wary against 
cyber security faults, I still don't feel it necessary to 
have a password manager app.” 
 
In many cases, the participants felt that their status-
quo behaviors were sufficient for the threat, regardless 
of the evidence about the consequences of poor 
password management. 
"I do not feel like I need one. I typically remember 
most of my passwords even if it takes me a try or two 
for a site so I do not have to enter the password very 
often." 
 
In some extreme cases (2% of the sample 
population), participant hubris of their current password 
management skills and memory (without a password 
manager) exacerbated their threat apathy to a feeling of 
invulnerability. 
“I did not find my personal information to be in 
danger because there is absolutely no way anyone 
can guess my passwords but I can remember them.” 
 
4.3 Technology Inhibitors 
 
The final category of behavioral inhibitors (reported 
by 20% of the participants) pertained to password 
manager application technology itself.  Our analysis 
identified three factors (presented in order of highest 
occurrence) about password manager application 
technology that represented the main reasons for not 
installing and using one. 
 
Insufficient Awareness 
 
Some participants (10%) reported that they were 
interested in taking the recommended security action but 
required more information about how to install and use 
the actual tool in order to decide on moving forward 
with the password manager application.  This awareness 
deficiency represents an explicit knowledge gap in the 
participants’ understanding of how the technology 
works and/or how to install and use it, as opposed to a 
perceived lack of ability to do so (low self-efficacy).   
“I have not researched and found a good one to use 
yet." 
 
One solution to their awareness deficiency, beyond 
researching password managers themselves, was for 
some participants to reach out to friends and family for 
additional information and guidance on using password 
managers. 
“I have not asked some of the people I trust (my dad 
and his work friends) if they use password 
managers.” 
 
A small group (2%) of participants reported concern 
about the amount of space the password manager 
application would take up on their electronic devices. 
“I am not sure which one to use and where to 
download it, and I am not sure how much space it 
will take up on my computer.” 
 
Alternative Solution 
 
A small group of participants (7%) reported that they 
were satisfied with their current password management 
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system.  The alternative solutions included relying on 
personal memory for all passwords, writing the 
passwords down in a physical notebook, and use of 
built-in computer password managers (web browser 
password storage, iCloud keychain, etc).   
 
Lack of Trust 
 
The final behavioral inhibitor related to the 
technology is a lack of trust (5% of respondents) that 
password managers will keep their information safe.  
The main concerns were having all the passwords in one 
location  
“Not super interested, and keeping all of my 
passwords in one place scares me.” 
 
And storing the password bank on the Internet. 
“I don't want my passwords online in one place.” 
 
4.4 Inhibitors of High Behavioral Intent Participants 
 
The behavioral inhibitors identified in sections 5.1 
through 5.3 emerged from the analyses of all 
participants’ responses in the sample and address the 
first research question of why do home end-users fail to 
adopt password management applications.  In order to 
address the second research question of why certain 
home end-users have high behavioral intentions but then 
fail to follow through on those intentions, we isolated 
the coded responses for all participants that showed a 
positive inclination (intention) towards taking the 
security action (by selecting average behavioral intent 
scores of 5 or greater on a 7 point Likert scale as 
discussed in Section 3.2).  Table 2 shows the ranked (in 
order of occurrence) behavioral inhibitors for both the 
entire sample and just the 59 participants that met the 
positive intention criteria.   
 
As seen on Table 2, those with higher behavioral 
intention scores were not inhibited by trust or low-self 
efficacy issues.  Additionally, while the perceived lack 
of time to install and use a password manager was still 
the primary inhibitor between intent and actual 
behavior, the order of precedence for the remaining 
behavioral inhibitors differs noticeably between the two 
groups.  For example, the high-intention group showed 
a relative decrease in the importance of threat apathy as 
compared to the group as a whole.  While the number of 
subjects in the high-intent group is relatively small 
(n=59), the results as shown in Table 2 suggest that 
addressing behavioral inhibitors with this group requires 
a different focus of effort in future threat messages and 
security awareness campaigns compared to users with 
lower intent scores. 
 
Table 2:  Group comparison of behavioral inhibitors 
 
 
5. Discussion and Future Research  
 
The main purpose of this study was to investigate 
why home end-users adopt or fail to adopt (both 
intentions and actual adoption) password management 
applications.  On the surface, these applications 
significantly reduce the risks associated with poor 
password management and are, by all reported accounts, 
very easy to use.  Yet, adoption rates among home end-
users is very low [24].  Through our analyses, we 
identified three predominant categorical themes 
consisting of eight individual behavioral inhibitors.  
Individual factors such as lack of immediacy and 
perceived lack of time were the most common reasons 
why our study participants identified as not 
downloading and using a password management 
application.   
 
Interestingly, a large portion of our subjects were 
quite naïve in terms of the threat associated with poor 
password management, which we labeled as threat 
apathy.  Even after seeing a password threat video 
outlining the threat and its associated dangers, the 
majority of subjects still did not recognize this as an 
issue that needed solving, which is quite troubling given 
the statistics related to poor password management 
among home end-users.  As a result, it is not surprising 
that having a high level of threat apathy resulted in very 
low adoption rates.  Our subjects did identify technology 
related issues inhibiting their adoption, but this was the 
least important of our identified themes.  This may be 
the case, because most of these applications are very 
easy to use (e.g., simplicity in use but complex in 
design) and other factors besides the software were 
driving the adopt versus not adopt decision. 
 
Several of the identified behavioral inhibitors have 
been explored in some fashion in previous security 
behavior-related research, but that research was 
primarily focused on better understanding the 
antecedents of security behavioral intentions.  For 
example, Bulgurcu, et al. [11] developed and tested a 
security behavior model that measured the effects of 
self-efficacy, response-efficacy, and rational choice 
perceived compliance costs on user attitudes toward an 
intentions to follow general security policies by 
Relative 
Ranking
Occurences 
(n=59)
Relative 
Ranking
Occurences 
(n=236)
Insufficient Time 1 35 1 97
Lack of Immediacy 2 8 3 35
Insufficient Awareness 3 7 5 19
Threat Apathy 4 6 2 59
Alternative Solution 5 5 6 16
Excessive Effort 6 3 4 29
Lack of Trust N/A 0 7 12
Low Self-efficacy N/A 0 8 10
Codes 
(Behavioral 
Inhibitors)
High Behavioral 
Intent Group Whole Sample
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organizational employees.  Likewise, Boss, et al. [8] 
found that threat apathy was a deterrent to employee 
intent to follow organizational security policies.  What 
makes our study unique is that we identified these 
factors as potential inhibitors that affect the transition 
between intent and actual behavior.   
 
We intend to take the findings of this research to 
improve the threat message about poor password 
management by specifically addressing the key 
behavioral inhibitors identified in the present study with 
the goal of increasing the rate of successful security 
behavior beyond the 13.5% experienced with the 
existing threat message.  Instead of a survey design for 
phase 1, future research can implement an experimental 
design with random assignment to one of several 
different password threat messages in order to increase 
adoption rates beyond the paltry 13.5%.  Future research 
can further investigate the perceived insufficient time 
and lack of immediacy issues by, possibly, 
demonstrating the quick installation and setup processes 
and/or manipulating installation time in a controlled 
experiment. 
 
We believe that recent current events related to poor 
password management, such as the major password 
leaks at LinkedIn and resulting hack of FaceBook CEO 
Mark Zuckerberg’s Twitter and Instagram accounts due 
to reuse of a weak password that was included in the 
LinkedIn data breach [32], will provide a more personal 
connection to home end-users and possibly reduce the 
effects of threat apathy on actual security behaviors.  
Password managers can help solve a real and important 
problem and it is important to theoretically and 
practically understand why home end-users are not 
adopting them.  These types of systems may reduce 
information security breaches associated with poor 
password management practices. 
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